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At a recent conference in Austin, TX, financial aid officers 
representing a wide variety of institutions shared secrets 
to combating this problem. Some of the tactics were 
unorthodox: perfumed envelopes, colored Easter bunnies 
and Valentine’s Day hearts, brightly colored paper with 
the words “CHECK INSIDE” stamped on the outside. But 
they worked—helping colleges successfully reach out to 
delinquent student borrowers. 
For some of the conference participants, the discussions 
had a familiar ring. Just over 10 years ago, a small group 
of historically black colleges and universities (HBCUs) in 
Texas confronted a similar crisis, one in which student 
loan defaults threatened the existence of the institutions. 
The steps they took to solve that problem have suddenly 
become relevant to a much broader set of colleges and 
universities today. 
The problem, then and now, starts with a number called 
the “cohort default rate,” which is calculated annually by 
the U.S. Department of Education for every college and 
university in the country that participates in the federal 
student aid program. The rate is the percentage of student 
borrowers who default (defined by the department as not 
making loan payments for 270 days) within two years of 
leaving school. 1 The federal government uses the cohort 
default rate to sanction colleges where too many students 
don’t pay back their loans. Any college with a rate higher 
than 25 percent for three consecutive years or above 40 
percent in any one year risks losing eligibility for federal 
student aid. Without access to federal grant and loan funds 
to help students pay tuition, a school’s very survival is at risk.
The average default rate has hovered around 5 percent 
since 2001, leaving most colleges far below the danger 
zone. But a number of things have happened in recent 
years to put substantially more colleges at risk. Rising 
college costs have forced students to borrow increasingly 
large amounts of money, sums that are more difficult to 
pay back. The latest cohort default rates, which track 
students who left school in 2007, showed the largest 
increase since 1989, with 6.7 percent of students 
defaulting on their federal loans.2 The classes of 2008 and 
2009 face bleak job prospects, putting more students at 
risk of defaulting and suffering its consequences—ruined 
credit and mounting debt from accumulated collection 
fees and unpaid interest.
At the same time, Congress has raised the bar for 
institutions. 2008 saw the reauthorization of the massive 
federal Higher Education Opportunity Act (HEOA). 
Provisions in that legislation mandate that, starting in 2014, 
colleges will be held accountable for the percentage of 
students who default within the first three years of leaving 
school instead of just two years. A recent Department of 
Education analysis found that 2007 cohort default rates 
jumped from 6.7 percent over two years to 11.8 percent 
over three years, a 76 percent increase.3 And despite the 
fact that the legislation increased the default threshold 
from 25 percent to 30 percent, the extended time frame 
will put many more schools at risk of facing sanctions. In 
2009, only two schools faced sanctions under the existing 
two-year calculation.4 But under the proposed three-year 
calculation, over 50 schools would be at risk.5
Most at risk are those schools that serve large numbers 
of first-generation and low-income students. These 
populations, which are at a higher risk of dropping out and 
are less likely to have family resources to rely on, are more 
likely to default.6 As such, those schools that serve them 
will find it harder to keep their cohort default rates below the 
federally mandated cut-offs, rendering them at greater risk 
of crossing the default rate threshold and losing eligibility 
for financial aid. Among for-profit institutions, for instance, 
default rates nearly doubled, growing from 11 percent 
to 21.2 percent. HBCUs as a whole saw a 60 percent 
increase, from an 11.6 percent average default rate to an 
18.5 percent default rate, with 10 institutions having default 
rates above 30 percent and several more coming close. 
But the experience of the Texas HBCUs, along with a new 
statistical analysis of cohort default rates, suggests that 
dangerously high default rates for institutions that serve 
at-risk students are not inevitable. From the initial financial 
Colleges across the nation are struggling to confront a growing problem 
in higher education: student debt. As more students borrow more money 
than ever before, and recent graduates enter the worst job market in a 
generation, students are increasingly unable to pay back their loans.
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aid package to providing individual counseling on loan 
repayment when students leave, institutions can take 
steps to help students avoid default. Schools can also 
maintain contact with students after they leave campus, 
communicating with them about when they need to begin 
repayment and where they should send their repayment 
checks. And for some schools, personal tactics like 
perfumed envelopes and holiday-themed mailings are 
especially effective in keeping students out of default.
Such “default aversion” strategies helped a number of 
HBCUs significantly lower their loan default rates and 
avoid losing eligibility for federal financial aid the last time 
the federal government imposed tough new default rate 
standards. Their story is one of teamwork, collaboration, 
and relationship-building and proves that when institutions 
are armed with the tools, resources, support, and 
commitment needed to lower default rates, they can do 
so successfully. With the recent HEOA amendment and a 
worsening economic outlook, all colleges can learn from 
the efforts of these schools. Their success is not only 
applicable to other similar institutions, but to all schools 
that serve those students most at risk for default and who 
are committed to helping them succeed.
Default aversion strategies, moreover, are just one part of 
the solution. Institutions that make increasing graduation 
rates a priority will also help their students repay their 
student loans. Put simply, students who graduate are less 
likely to default.7 As institutions face the next default rate 
challenge, those that combine default aversion strategies 
with strategies for degree completion will be in the best 
position to not only reduce their default rates now and 
in the future, but to improve the overall success of their 
institutions and their students. 
THE STORY
The default rate sanctions were established in 1990 to 
crack down on fraudulent, fly-by-night schools that left 
students with no legitimate degree and a lot of debt. At that 
time, student loan defaults were a much more widespread 
problem than they are today. In 1990, the cohort default 
rate hit an all-time high of 22.4 percent.8 Despite 
earlier efforts by the U.S. Department of Education to 
encourage, and sometimes force, repayment through wage 
garnishment, negative credit reports, and increased efforts 
to contact borrowers, default rates remained high. In a 
time of growing budget deficits, the high default rates were 
costing taxpayers more than $3 billion a year, increasing 
pressure on Congress to clamp down on loan defaults.9 
In response, Congress began sanctioning schools—and 
not just students—for student loan defaults. In the years 
following the enforcement of the default rate thresholds, 
more than 1,000 schools have been denied participation 
in the federal student aid program and default rates have 
dropped precipitously. (See sidebar “Cohort Default Rates” 
for explanation of calculations and sanctions process.) 
When the default rules were first put into place, many 
HBCUs had default rates above the legislated cut-offs. 
Recognized as playing a unique and valuable role in 
higher education, these schools were at first exempted 
from the default rate cut-offs and allowed to continue 
participating in the federal loan program. (See sidebar 
“About HBCUs.”) But this exemption ended with the 
1998 Higher Education Act reauthorization, and HBCUs 
with default rates above the cut-off were given until 2004 
to lower them. Those institutions unable to do so would 
be at risk of losing eligibility to participate in the federal 
loan program.10 In 1999, 14 historically black institutions 
were at risk of losing eligibility. By 2002, 12 of these 
schools had successfully lowered their default rates 
below the threshold through default management plans 
that included improving student retention and graduation, 
better loan counseling, partnerships with outside financial 
aid experts, and improved financial aid packaging.11 
In Texas: ‘We’re Not Going Down  
Like This’
Seven of the 14 colleges identified as having high default 
rates in 1999 were located in Texas—Texas Southern 
University, Huston-Tillotson College, Jarvis Christian 
College, Paul Quinn College, Southwestern Christian 
College, Texas College, and Wiley College. With the 
exception of Texas Southern, one of the nation’s largest 
HBCUs and a public university, these schools are all private 
four-year colleges and represent some of the smallest 
and least wealthy among their peers. Enrollments average 
around 600 students, and the average endowment per 
student is $8,600, well below the median endowment of 
$16,000 per student among private four-year institutions.12 
For such schools, losing federal student aid money would 
be disastrous, likely forcing them to shut their doors. The 
mission of these institutions is to serve first-generation, low-
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COHORT DEFAULT RATES
The two-year cohort default rate is the percentage of a school’s borrowers who enter repayment on a federal Stafford student loan 
in one fiscal year and who default in that fiscal year or the next. The 2007 two-year cohort default rate, for example, calculated 
the percentage of borrowers at a school who entered repayment between October 1, 2006, and September 30, 2007, and who 
subsequently defaulted on or before September 30, 2008.
The three-year cohort default rate calculation tracks the number of students who default for an additional year, but does not change 
the denominator—the number of students entering repayment. The three-year 2007 cohort default rate, for example, calculates the 
percentage of borrowers who enter repayment between October 1, 2006, and September 30, 2007, and who default on or before 
September 30, 2009. Because the numerator in this equation will almost certainly go up—tracking students for an additional year 
will catch more defaulters—the three-year calculation will result in higher default rates for nearly every institution. 
Schools, however, won’t face sanctions for the new three-year default rate calculation until 2014, at which time the threshold for 
sanctions will also increase. Currently, a school loses eligibility for federal financial aid if it has a two-year cohort default rate above 
25 percent for three consecutive years or above 40 percent in any one year. In addition, there are benefits to schools with two-year 
default rates below 10 percent. These schools are allowed to deliver loan funds in one payment and can disburse funds immediately 
to first-year undergraduate students. When sanctions for the three-year calculations take effect in 2014, schools will risk losing 
federal student aid for having default rates above 30 percent over three years, or 40 percent in one year, and will receive benefits for 
having default rates below 15 percent.
In the spring before official cohort default rates are released, the U.S. Department of Education notifies each school of its draft 
cohort default rate. Schools have the opportunity within 45 days of the release of the draft rates to challenge the accuracy of the 
default rate data under an “incorrect data challenge.” The success rate on incorrect data challenges typically exceeds 40 percent.* 
Schools with a low percentage of borrowers can also file a “participation rate index challenge” to avoid sanctions. The participation 
rate index is calculated by multiplying the school’s cohort default rate by the total number of borrowers over a 12-month period 
divided by the total number of students enrolled over that 12-month period. Schools with a cohort default rate of 25 percent or 
more over three years can qualify for the participation rate index exemption by having a participation rate index of .0375 or less in 
any of the three years. Schools with a cohort default rate of 40 percent or more must have a participation rate index of .06015 or 
less to qualify for the exemption.
If schools still face sanctions after exhausting their challenges, there are still data adjustment and appeal options available:
Uncorrected Data Adjustment, New Data Adjustment, or Erroneous Data Appeal: Schools can appeal official cohort default 
rates based on incorrect or new data. If data was not corrected after a successful incorrect data challenge to the draft default rates, 
schools can submit an “uncorrected data adjustment” to correct the default rate data. 
Loan Servicing Appeal: Schools can file a “loan servicing appeal,” which alleges that a defaulted loan was not properly serviced 
by the borrower’s lender or, under the Direct Loan program, by the loan servicer. Improper servicing appeals are successful if the 
school can provide evidence that a borrower never made a payment and the lender or servicer failed to take action in contacting the 
borrower, including failing to send at least one letter urging the borrower to make payments or failing to attempt at least one phone 
call to the borrower.
Economically Disadvantaged Appeal: Schools can file an “economically disadvantaged appeal” if they enroll a high number of 
low-income students and can prove high graduation or job placement rates. Degree-granting schools must submit an independent 
auditor’s written opinion that the school’s low-income rate is two-thirds or more and that the school’s completion rate is 70 percent 
or more. Non-degree granting schools must submit a written opinion that the low-income rate is two-thirds or more and the job 
placement rate is 44 percent or more.
Average Rates Appeal: For schools with fewer than 30 borrowers in any one year, cohort default rates are calculated as an average 
of the prior three years. This avoids large fluctuations from year to year because of small cohorts. Under an “average rates appeal,” 
a school with default rates greater than 25 percent over three years can avoid sanctions if at least two of those years were averaged 
default rates, but would have been less than 25 percent had the rate not been averaged. A school with a default rate above 40 
percent in any one year will not face sanctions if the cohort default rate was an averaged rate, regardless of what the rate would 
have been without averaging.
Participation Rate Index Appeal: If a school does not file a participation rate index challenge based on draft default rates, the 
school can file a “participation rate index appeal.” If the school meets the requirements described above for the participation rate 
challenge, it will not be subject to sanctions. A school facing sanctions because of a 25 percent or higher default rate over the prior 
three years may file a participation rate index appeal for any of the prior three years.
Thirty-or-Fewer Borrowers Appeal: If a combined total of 30 or fewer borrowers entered repayment over the prior three years, the 
school is not subject to sanctions. 
For more details on cohort default rates, see the U.S. Department of Education’s Cohort Default Rate Guide, available at: http://ifap.
ed.gov/DefaultManagement/finalcdrg.html 
*Note: Mark Walsh, U.S. Department of Education, Special Initiatives Services, in discussion with author, January 2010.
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income students—the students who rely most heavily on 
federal grant and loan funds for college. Among the seven 
Texas HBCUs that risked losing access to federal student 
aid funds, 80 percent of the students receive Pell grants (the 
federal aid money that goes to the lowest-income college 
students), and 78 percent borrow to pay for their education.13 
Without access to this money, few of the students enrolled in 
these seven colleges would be able to pay tuition.
Bronte Jones, former assistant dean of financial services 
at Huston-Tillotson in Austin, remembers being in “crisis 
mode” in the summer of 1999, just months before the 
new rules were to go into effect. During a number of 
meetings held to discuss the issue and bring together 
administrators from the “at-risk” campuses, it was clear, 
Jones says, that no one really knew how to get started. 
Although schools had until 2004 to lower their default 
rates, the new regulations became effective July 1, 1999, 
requiring all of the HBCUs with high default rates to 
submit a “default management plan” to the secretary of 
education for approval. The department also required 
schools to hire an independent third-party consultant 
to help with implementing the plan, as well as provide 
evidence to the secretary that the rate had improved and 
that the plan was being successfully implemented.
The department provided assistance to schools in 
designing and implementing the plans, hosting a meeting 
at Paul Quinn in February to review the new requirements 
and outline what was expected. Over the next few 
months, a number of outside groups stepped in to offer 
their assistance as well, sponsoring training sessions 
on default prevention, technical help, and on-site review 
of the default management plans.14 The Department 
of Education also reached out to Texas Guaranteed, a 
loan guarantee agency based in Austin with experience 
working with Texas HBCUs, and asked the company to 
dedicate resources to addressing the issue. In response, 
Texas Guaranteed launched a new initiative, “Achieving 
Systemic Default Aversion,” which included creating a 
new position, a default aversion consultant, who would 
travel to the individual schools and work directly with them 
and make sure they stayed on track. Texas Guaranteed 
also provided $15,000 in grant assistance to help the 
schools pay for the independent third-party consultant. 
As the July 1 deadline approached, however, it was clear 
that some schools were still behind, prompting Jones 
and others to decide to pool their resources in order to 
ensure that all the schools would be successful. As a 
result, six of the schools joined together and formed, with 
the assistance and leadership of Texas Guaranteed, the 
Texas Historically Black Colleges and Universities Default 
Management Consortium.15 The consortium committed 
to quarterly meetings and sharing best practices. And the 
leadership from Texas Guaranteed gave them a partner 
with expertise in loans and default prevention. 
According to Jones, who served as the consortium’s first 
chairwoman, the team approach is what ensured that all of 
the schools met the new requirements. “The partnership 
gave us a lot of power,” she says, pointing to the process 
of hiring a third-party consultant as a good example of 
how collaborating made a difference. Alone, she suggests, 
the schools would not have been taken seriously by the 
vendors, but by interviewing the candidates together, 
they were able to find a vendor that met all of their needs, 
including professional development for financial aid staff, 
new technology, and an understanding of the unique 
mission and nature of their institutions. “You have to 
understand our campuses. Our staff was not well-trained 
or savvy in the area of default management,” she explains. 
“To not have partnered would have meant failure.”
Failure would have not only been disastrous for the 
individual schools affected, but it would have had a 
broader impact on their peer institutions across the nation, 
says Jones, who left Huston-Tillotson in 2006 to become 
treasurer at St. John’s College in Annapolis, Md. “There 
is a sentiment in the HBCU community that others feel 
they are no longer relevant; that some want to do away 
ABOUT HBCUS
The Higher Education Act defines an HBCU as “any historically 
black college or university that was established before 1964, 
whose principal mission was, and is, the education of black 
Americans…” Today there are more than 100 HBCUs in the 
country, most of which were founded immediately after the 
Civil War in order to educate newly freed blacks who were 
denied access to predominantly white institutions. 
Although HBCUs share a historic mission, they are very diverse. 
They include public and private universities, two-year and 
four-year schools, single-sex and coeducational institutions, 
research universities, and small liberal arts colleges. Overall, 
these schools educate close to 300,000 students. And four-
year HBCUs enroll about one out of every five black students 
attending a four-year institution and grant a similar proportion 
of all bachelor’s degrees awarded to black students.*
*Steven Provasnik and Linda Shafer, Historically Black Colleges and 
Universities, 1976 to 2001 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 
Education, National Center for Education Statistics, 2004).
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with HBCUs.” In response to this sentiment, the tagline of 
the group became “We’re not going down like this.” This 
determination coupled with the teamwork, collaboration, 
and partnership worked. Sharing best practices and 
tweaking them to fit their individual campuses, each 
school reduced its default rate in the first year. The 
success of the Texas consortium approach is apparent 
when default rates for these six institutions are compared 
with the six HBCUs that did not participate in the 
consortium.16 While both groups of colleges successfully 
lowered their default rates, the six consortium schools did 
so faster and more dramatically. (See Figure 1)
DEFAULT AVERSION 101
Much of what worked for the Texas consortium schools 
appears to be default aversion 101. Before the new 
regulations, the consortium schools were doing minimal 
default aversion work, says Shelia Dunlap, assistant vice 
president for default prevention at Texas Guaranteed, who 
helped lead the effort. “Once the schools started doing 
the things they were required to do, they found success,” 
she says. 
A Campuswide Concern
One of the first steps toward that success was to create 
institutional buy-in and support, endorsed by the president 
and top leadership. Successful default management 
required the interest and commitment of those not 
traditionally concerned with financial aid issues. Yet, it 
was a challenge, Dunlap says, “to get the administration 
and faculty to see that it was not just the responsibility 
of the financial aid office.” The initial lack of institutional 
support was due to a lack of understanding of the issue, 
Dunlap says. But once the leadership understood the 
consequences of inaction both to the students and to 
the institution, “they were on board, making everyone 
reliable and accountable.” At one school, Dunlap recalls, 
the president brought in the entire faculty and staff on a 
holiday to discuss default management and ensured they 
had a plan by the end of the day. Dwight Fennell, now 
president of Texas College, was provost at Paul Quinn 
College in the late 1990s, when the school was faced with 
bringing down its default rate. He remembers it as a “top-
down driven assignment,” where default prevention efforts 
were “internal to the institution’s organization,” meaning 
they were the responsibility of the entire institution, not 
just confined to one office.
Figure 1. Average Cohort Default Rates Among HBCUs Facing Sanctions, 1987–2007
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To ensure that default management was a campuswide 
concern, school officials created a default management 
team. Teams brought together administrators and staff 
from all aspects of the school, i.e., from admissions to 
alumni affairs. As such, default prevention efforts covered 
as much of a student’s on-campus interactions as 
possible. The team approach was particularly effective in 
helping schools deal with students who “stopped out,” 
meaning they left school for a semester or more to work 
or deal with family obligations but intended to return, 
and also with students who dropped out entirely. These 
students are much more likely to default. According to 
the Department of Education, 70 percent of the defaults 
in the department’s loan program come from students 
who dropped out.17 And research has shown that whether 
a student earns a degree is one of the most important 
predictors of whether that student will eventually 
default.18 
By involving a variety of campus departments, officials 
at the Texas consortium colleges could intervene before 
a student made the decision to leave. Academic affairs 
staff, for instance, would alert the financial aid office when 
a student’s grades dropped significantly, a sign that a 
student might be about to drop out. And faculty members 
were prepared to alert both academic affairs and the 
financial aid office when a student stopped showing up 
to class, another sign of impending drop out. Finally, the 
registrar’s office would signal a warning when a student 
failed to enroll or withdrew from classes. (See sidebar 
“The Default Management Team.”)
Once students left campus—whether they dropped 
out, transferred, or graduated—they were more difficult 
to keep track of, making it harder for financial aid staff 
to locate students and inform them of their repayment 
obligations. Again, the team approach was effective 
for the consortium schools. The registrar’s office would 
issue a hold on students’ transcripts, forcing students 
to contact the financial aid office before their transcripts 
could be released. And since alumni affairs staff made it 
a priority to keep track of students after they graduated, 
they were often in a position to help default prevention 
managers locate hard-to-find students. 
Default Management ‘Superstars’
Schools created a default management team, pulling 
together administrators from all across campus to 
tackle the issue. Another important first step for the 
consortium schools was to appoint a default prevention 
manager, a sole person responsible for coordinating 
team efforts and executing a school’s approved default 
management plan. A 1998 General Accounting Office 
study on student loan defaults at HBCUs found that 
creating a “default rate manager position or retain[ing] a 
consultant to track and contact delinquent borrowers” 
was commonly cited as a default reduction measure by 
administrators at HBCUs that formerly had high default 
rates.20
Many of the Texas consortium schools brought in an 
additional staff person to serve in this role, either by 
reallocating resources within institutions’ operating 
budgets or by using federal funding provided through 
HEOA’s Title III, which supports HBCUs and other 
minority-serving institutions. Jones, Fennell, and others 
emphasized the need for the default manager to be a full-
time position, someone with a considerable amount of his 
or her time dedicated to the role’s many tasks. They were 
the ones who served as a liaison between the financial aid 
office and other on-campus departments; worked closely 
with third-party consultants, guarantors, and lenders to 
keep track of students who were near default; analyzed 
data to create profiles of students most likely to default 
and to identify early warning signs of students at risk 
of dropping out or defaulting; raised awareness among 
students, faculty, and staff of the default problem; and 
developed programs to educate borrowers about loans 
and improve financial literacy. 
Given the importance of the default rate problem at the 
time, default managers became, according to Jones, 
“superstars overnight” on many of the campuses. 
And successful default prevention managers worked 
to develop a personal relationship with the students, 
showing interest in and concern about students’ futures 
and how the consequences of defaulting on student loans 
can hinder their future options. “Mentoring and close 
relationships are key,” says Eric King, who worked in 
the financial aid office at Jarvis Christian College during 
what he calls the “big panic.” “If you’re not willing to have 
those, then the default rate will go through the roof.” 
King, who is now director of financial aid at Wiley College, 
says he treats the students “like they are my own kids.” 
Similarly, Fennell likened the internal default manager to 
a “surrogate parent.” It is no surprise then to see highly 
personal tactics on the Texas consortium’s list of “25 
Best Practices.” Among the most personal are sending 
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student borrowers birthday cards, calling them during 
special holidays, and planning default prevention visits 
in conjunction with special events (e.g., social gatherings 
and athletic events).21 
The small, intimate nature of the seven HBCUs in the 
Texas consortium made this kind of personal contact a 
natural extension of the institutions’ familial atmosphere 
and frequent interactions between faculty and staff 
and students.22 But personal contact does not need to 
be limited to small colleges. Research has shown that 
fostering high student engagement and encouraging 
frequent interactions between faculty and students are 
two successful strategies for improving student academic 
performance and retention, both of which ultimately lead 
to lower loan default rates.23
Outside Partnerships
Partnerships with outside entities—all with experience 
in skip tracing, the process of finding and successfully 
contacting borrowers, collections, and personalized 
customer service—proved as important to successful 
default management as on-campus relationships. Working 
closely with independent third-party consultants, lenders, 
and guarantee agencies allowed the consortium schools 
to increase their capacity to locate, keep track of, and 
communicate with former students. The third-party 
consultant that worked with the consortium schools 
was “actively involved,” says Jones. “They came to our 
campuses, uploaded software, trained our staff, and 
worked closely with them. They were concerned about us 
getting out of this.” 
DEFAULT MANAGEMENT TEAM
The chart below is taken from the “Breaking New Ground” report published by the Texas HBCU Default Management Consortium. 
The chart outlines the departments that should be represented on an institution’s default management team, their contribution 
to the team, and what the campus gains from their participation. By including personnel from each of these areas, the default 
management team can be most effective in implementing a default management plan.
Office Contribution Knowledge gained
Academic Affairs Informing team of academic standards and student 
progress
Educating faculty members on their role in default 
aversion
Student Affairs Voicing the concerns and suggestions of the student 
body and campus areas designed specifically to meet 
the needs of the students
Creating an environment to support the efforts of 
default aversion
Fiscal Affairs Providing budgetary information including endowment 
and institutional funds, student costs and administering 
Title III funds
Incorporating current default trends to assist in making 
adjustments within the budget
Alumni Affairs Updating the team on changes in demographic and 
employment statuses of graduates
Communicating successful repayment and default 
aversion measures for former students
Financial Aid Education of college community on the packaging 
philosophy and promoting gift aid
Utilizing information in revising and updating office 
procedures and packaging philosophy
Career Planning/
Placement
Informing the team of expected salaries of the 
graduates based on fields of study and their placement 
success rates
Providing an outlet to disseminate unemployment and 
economic hardship deferment options
Institutional 
Research
Analyzing data to assist in identifying potential 
defaulters
Incorporating new variables into current research and 
statistical models
Registrar Reporting of enrollment status, withdrawals, course 
load adjustments, and classification
Developing a new understanding of how they play a 
major role in proactive default measures and tactics to 
increase retention and student success
Admission Reporting of special academic needs based on 
transcript evaluation
Enhancing recruiting techniques to identify high-risk 
defaulters
Administration Allocating funds for the support of default aversion 
measures and providing atmosphere for campus 
commitment
Promoting a campuswide approach to proactive 
default aversion
Source: Breaking New Ground: The Texas Historically Black Colleges and Universities Default Management Consortium, (Round Rock, TX: Texas 
Guaranteed, 2004).
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Outside partnerships also helped the consortium schools 
improve the technology they were using to track students. 
At the same time that Texas Guaranteed was working 
with the Texas consortium, another loan company, Sallie 
Mae, began its HBCU Default Management Project, a 
yearlong study of the HBCUs that were at risk of losing 
access to loan funds. The final report from the Sallie Mae 
study found that, “many of the HBCUs lack the types 
of technology-driven resources that might help reduce 
default rates.”24 In light of this finding, the institutions 
that participated in the Sallie Mae study, including the 
consortium colleges, shared a $275,000 grant from 
Microsoft to upgrade the colleges’ technology and ability 
to track student borrowers. 
With the new investments in technology, institutions 
were able to get more accurate, real-time information 
on students’ repayment statuses. As a result, default 
prevention managers could get students on the phone 
early, when they first missed payments, and explain 
options for deferment or forbearance that could keep 
students out of default. In some cases, schools moved 
to track students who were in loan repayment as often 
as daily or weekly. Texas Guaranteed’s Integrated Default 
Assistant (IDA) system, for instance, allows schools to 
access customized reports on which students are behind 
on payments and find out the institution’s projected 
three-year cohort default rate on Texas Guaranteed 
loans. Institutions can also target their default prevention 
activities to students most at risk by generating reports 
of students based on whether they graduated or their 
academic standing when they were last enrolled. This 
type of targeted outreach can be effective in reducing 
loan defaults. A 2004 study published in the NASFAA 
Journal of Student Financial Aid found, for example, that 
the Advocate Unit, a program that contacted borrowers 
during their six-month grace period and targeted those 
students at the highest risk of falling behind on loan 
payments, was effective in reducing defaults. According 
to the study, the simple task of contacting borrowers and 
informing them of their repayment responsibilities and 
options was enough to reduce the default rate among this 
high-risk population.25
Moreover, by tracking which students default and 
coordinating databases from across the campus, 
default managers and financial aid offices were able to 
understand which students were most likely to default, 
which, according to Jones, “made a difference in 
decisions about financial aid packages, advising students, 
and tutoring students.” Financial aid offices could then 
direct grant and work study aid to those students least 
able to manage debt, particularly in their first years in 
college, and the academic and student affairs offices 
could target academic and social support services to 
those students most likely to drop out. Coordinating data 
across campus also improved financial aid offices’ ability 
to maintain up-to-date contact information and keep track 
of students’ academic progress.
Packaging Philosophy
Knowing which students were likely to default was an 
important step, empowering schools to make changes 
early in the student loan process. Miles College, a private 
HBCU in Fairfield, Ala., was also on the list of schools 
at risk of losing federal financing in 1998. And like the 
Texas consortium schools, Miles brought its default 
rate down significantly, and it has kept its rate below 
the federal threshold ever since. Diana Knighton, chief 
fiscal officer for Miles College, helped implement the 
school’s default management plan and remembers that 
a big component of the school’s success was changing 
the way financial aid officers “packaged” students, the 
process of deciding how much aid students receive and 
how that aid will be divided among loans, grants, and/or 
work-study. “We were like many schools,” Knighton says, 
CONSEQUENCES OF DEFAULTING ON STUDENT LOANS
Defaulting on student loans has serious consequences for the 
borrower. “The U.S. Department of Education is responsible for 
recovering those funds for the taxpayers, and we have a variety 
of tools to use in accomplishing that,” says Mark Walsh, who 
recently moved from the department’s Default Prevention office 
to the Special Initiatives team. Walsh lists wage garnishment, 
federal and state tax refund seizure, and seizure of any federal 
payment among those tools. He also says that borrowers may 
be sued in Federal District Court, and students who default 
lose eligibility for additional federal education funding. 
Defaulting also affects a student’s future job prospects and 
quality of life. In some states, Walsh says, defaulting may 
prohibit a borrower’s occupational license from being issued 
or renewed. And since defaulted loans are reported to credit 
bureaus, borrowers sustain long-term damage to their credit 
rating. Damaged credit ratings, in turn, make it difficult to 
get a mortgage or rent a house, or even to purchase a car. 
Borrowers with poor credit are also subject to paying higher 
interest rates on many forms of credit.
For more information, visit the department’s Web site “Facing 
Loan Default,” http://www.ed.gov/offices/OSFAP/DCS/default.
html.
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“out of control with our packaging … meeting students 
with more than their direct costs.” Miles moved quickly to 
change its packaging philosophy to minimize borrowing, 
so that students were only given loans that amount 
to a small percentage above their direct costs, which 
included allowances for things like basic transportation 
and books.
This philosophy is still in place at Miles, says Knighton, 
and remains key to the school’s ability to manage its 
default rate. But it has gotten harder for schools like 
Miles to keep students from taking on too much debt. 
Limits on federal loans have recently increased in an 
effort to keep pace with rising college costs, allowing 
undergraduate students to accumulate $31,000 in federal 
loans by graduation. And private student loans, which 
are not guaranteed by the federal government and have 
none of the safeguards of federal loans, grew steadily 
through 2008—offering students ever-easier access to 
student loan debt.26 These higher debt levels make it 
more difficult for students to keep up with payments after 
graduation and can increase the likelihood of default. In a 
10-year follow-up study of students who graduated from 
college, the Department of Education found that default 
rates steadily increased with debt levels—20 percent of 
students with the highest debt levels defaulted within 
10 years, compared with 7 percent of students with the 
lowest debt levels.27 The growing availability of debt also 
makes it more difficult for financial aid officers to ensure 
students aren’t borrowing too much. Colleges don’t 
always know when students have taken out private loans, 
and aid officers may even need to counsel students away 
from taking on the maximum federal loan amount. 
Cecilia Jones, financial aid director at Texas College, says 
they only include in an aid package the amount of loans 
absolutely necessary for a student to attend. But students 
might be eligible for additional federal loans beyond that 
amount, which the financial aid office must give them if 
they request it. When students request additional loan 
money, Jones says that gives the financial aid office the 
opportunity to counsel students about the consequences 
of taking on more debt. They also reach out to parents 
and educate them on the consequences of students 
taking on too much debt in college, hopefully gaining an 
ally in the effort to keep students out of excessive debt. 
At Wiley College, King is implementing a similar strategy. 
When students request more loan money than they 
need, King sits down with them and shows them how the 
additional debt will translate into higher monthly payments 
after graduation, and how much more they’ll need to earn 
to make those payments. 
“One of the worst things an institution can do,” Fennell 
says, “is to package to the point where the student, when 
they graduate, can’t get a job to meet their repayment 
obligations.” Fennell points to students who live off 
campus, but don’t really need to, and who often become 
saddled with high housing and transportation costs. “They 
find themselves as working adults with debt, so that effort 
becomes full-time and the education becomes part time.” 
Enrollment and Retention
Educating themselves on which students were likely to 
default also forced schools to look more closely at the 
students they were enrolling. Looking back to the changes 
some HBCUs made in 1998, Bronte Jones noted that 
schools faced pressure to keep enrollment numbers up 
and sometimes would “enroll high-risk students.” This 
led to many students dropping out and failing to repay 
their loans. While some schools tightened admissions 
standards, most schools just became more realistic about 
the deficiencies among their students. “It was a wake-
up call,” says Jones. “Schools revisited their satisfactory 
academic progress policies and got more serious about 
support services—they looked at who they were bringing 
in and what they needed to be successful.”
As a result, schools recognized that retention efforts 
worked in concert with default prevention. In describing 
the default prevention efforts at Miles College, which 
has maintained an open-enrollment policy, Knighton 
highlighted the school’s tutorial and remedial labs, where 
students can get additional help in math, reading, and 
English. Even in the collections phase, Knighton says, 
the focus is on getting students back into school. Miles 
financial aid staff advises students against dropping 
out, but if they do find that Miles is not a good fit, they 
encourage students to complete the semester and then 
transfer to another institution. In so doing, students will at 
least earn credits for the semester and avoid wasting loan 
money on incomplete courses. 
This philosophy mirrors recommendations from the U.S. 
Department of Education. Mark Walsh, who recently 
moved from the department’s Default Prevention office to 
the Special Initiatives team, which works specifically with 
minority-serving institutions, recommends that schools 
10 EDUCATION SECTOR REPORTS: Lowering Student Loan Default Rates www.educationsector.org
“aggressively reach out to students who withdraw to try 
and help them overcome obstacles to continuing their 
education.” Says Walsh: “Many borrowers have the 
misconception that by leaving school they are somehow 
relieved of their loan responsibilities. Once they learn they 
must still repay a loan, some elect to come back.” He 
also points out that students who abruptly withdraw from 
school not only lack a degree, but also miss out on loan 
exit counseling and job placement assistance, putting 
them at an even higher risk of default.
Under Fennell’s leadership, Texas College hired a retention 
coordinator to improve graduation rates. The retention 
coordinator, akin to the default prevention manager, is 
responsible for aligning retention efforts across campus. 
Both positions are under the “enrollment services” 
umbrella, with the retention coordinator working closely 
with faculty to ensure they report student absences and 
academic problems. These early warning signs are critical 
to the college’s early alert system, intended to catch 
students before they leave campus and provide them with 
the support they need to stay.
Early alert systems have the added benefit of ensuring 
that students who do drop out get repayment notifications 
about their loans during the full six-month grace period. 
According to the Department of Education, 91 percent 
of borrowers who defaulted did not receive their full 
grace period because of late or inaccurate notification 
by the school.19 During the grace period, loan servicers, 
the companies that process students’ loan payments, 
establish contact with borrowers and notify them of their 
repayment options—those six months are an important 
time for students to learn of their repayment obligations 
and for servicers to determine if there is a problem 
contacting a borrower. Institutions that keep close tabs 
on students—by taking attendance at classes, monitoring 
grades, and communicating across campus—are in a 
better position to know as soon as a student has stopped 
attending and can notify the lender promptly, allowing the 
student to receive his or her full six months of services.
Student retention was an important focus of default 
prevention in 1998. The Texas consortium’s recommended 
strategies for lowering default rates included improving 
“academic persistence and retention” as a key strategy.28 
But institutions also used many other strategies, such as 
improved communication with students and better tracking 
of borrowers, to target the “low hanging fruit,” including 
students who didn’t know their loans needed to be repaid, 
who lost communication with their school, or who needed 
a deferment because of unemployment. It appears that 
these other strategies, and not a focus on retention, 
explain most of the institutions’ success in lowering default 
rates. The data available from 1999 forward do not indicate 
dramatic increases in graduation rates among this group 
of HBCUs.29 As institutions face the next default rate 
challenge, though, the low-hanging fruit has already been 
picked, and improving graduation rates holds the biggest 
potential for reducing default rates in the future.
Financial Literacy
In many ways, the default prevention process for these 
schools and its success came down to the schools 
doing what they are charged to do—educate their 
students. “There was a heightened need to make sure 
students understood the consequences of not taking this 
seriously,” says Bronte Jones. “We served a lot of first-
generation college students who only heard about loans 
and debt in negative terms, so we did things to help them 
understand debt. There’s debt when you buy that new 
car so you can be cute on campus, and there is student 
loan debt that is leading you somewhere. Colleges need 
to help students understand financial decisions and the 
implications of financial decisions,” says Jones. One 
of the things the consortium did was to produce their 
own student loan guide, with fellow students, Jones, 
and others talking about their positive experiences with 
student loan debt.
Overall the Texas consortium schools worked to do a 
better job of educating students about the pros and cons 
of borrowing. They instituted financial literacy courses 
and hosted financial aid awareness fairs. Some schools 
also required loan counseling as often as each semester 
or quarter, which is much more frequent than the federally 
mandated “entrance” counseling when students first take 
out a loan and “exit” counseling when students leave 
school. In-person entrance and exit counseling was also 
identified as a valuable strategy. Many of the HBCUs, 
rather than have students watch a presentation on the 
computer or in a large lecture room when they take out 
loans and prepare to leave college, sit down with students 
one-on-one to discuss their repayment schedule, the 
consequences of default, and the options students have 
if they’re struggling with payments. These sessions build 
students’ awareness of their debt and also reinforce that 
the financial aid office is a resource they can turn to if they 
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run into trouble. A study conducted in 1987 of borrowers 
at California community colleges and proprietary schools 
highlights the importance of good information, finding that 
some financial aid practices, including providing financial 
aid services on site, informing applicants of total costs, 
providing applicants with repayment information, and 
informing applicants of the consequences of default, were 
significantly associated with lower default rates. 30
Counseling sessions also give financial aid officers a 
chance to make sure students understand the difference 
between grant aid, which does not need to be repaid, and 
INSTITUTIONS’ BEST PRACTICES
Students who graduate are less likely to default; thus, emphasizing retention and student success tops any list of best practices 
in default prevention and management. Yet, there are specific strategies that institutions can take to help prevent and lower their 
default rates and ultimately help their students avoid the consequences of loan default. 
Create and Implement a Default Management Plan
The U.S. Department of Education recommends that all schools implement a default prevention and management plan and 
provides a sample one on its Web site, available at http://www.ifap.ed.gov/dpcletters/attachments/GEN0514Attach.pdf. Those 
HBCUs identified as having high default rates in 1999 were required to submit a plan to the secretary of education for approval in 
order to maintain Title IV eligibility.
Create a Default Management Team 
Successful default management requires the interest and commitment of those not traditionally concerned with the issue. To make 
sure default management was a campuswide concern, school officials brought together staffers from a variety of departments; thus 
creating a team to tackle the problem. 
Institute Early Alert Systems
According to the U.S. Department of Education, 70 percent of the defaults in the department’s loan program come from students 
who dropped out. Identifying students who might drop out as early as possible (for example when they withdraw from several 
classes, or accumulate a high number of absences) can go a long way toward preventing loan default. Early alert systems also help 
schools target their outreach to students most at risk of defaulting.
Appoint a Default Prevention Manager
An important first step for the Texas consortium schools was to appoint a default prevention manager, a sole person responsible for 
coordinating team efforts and executing the school’s default management plan. These individuals worked closely with third-party 
consultants, guarantors, and lenders to keep track of students who were near default and led efforts to communicate with students 
both on and off campus.
Encourage Personal Contact With Students 
On the Texas consortium schools’ small campuses, personal contact was inherent in each school’s culture. But default prevention 
managers and other financial aid staffers still made it a priority to have direct contact with students, for instance, conducting in-
person entrance and exit loan counseling even when online versions were available. 
Establish Partnerships With Outside Entities
Working closely with independent third-party consultants, lenders, and guarantee agencies allowed the consortium schools to 
increase their capacity to locate, keep track of, and communicate with former students. These companies provided experience and 
expertise in skip tracing, the process of finding and successfully contacting borrowers, collections, and customer service. 
Improve Technology
Better technology helped schools improve their ability to track student borrowers. In some cases, it helped them track students 
more frequently—as often as weekly or daily. Schools were also able to get real-time information on a student’s repayment status. 
As a result, default prevention managers could move quickly to contact students when they first missed payments and explain their 
repayment options. 
Avoid Giving Students More Than Their Direct Costs 
Schools took a closer look at the way their financial aid officers packaged students, the process of deciding how much aid students 
receive and how that aid will be divided among loans, grants, and/or work-study. Schools then moved to make sure they only 
included in an aid package the amount of loans absolutely necessary for a student to attend their school.
Educate Students About Debt and Its Consequences
Schools worked to educate students about the pros and cons of borrowing, instituted financial literacy courses, hosted financial 
aid awareness fairs, and mandated entrance and exit counseling each semester or quarter. The personal counseling sessions were 
particularly effective, building students’ awareness of their debt and also reinforcing that the financial aid office is a resource they 
can turn to if they run into trouble.
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loans, and also help students understand the process of 
repaying their loans, including where to send repayment 
checks. The multitude of grant and loan programs can 
easily be confusing, particularly for students who are the 
first in their family to attend college, and this confusion 
can lead to students defaulting on their loans. A 1998 
analysis of a national survey of students who defaulted 
on their loans found, for example, that nearly one in four 
students reported being confused by the repayment 
process.31 Another study, which interviewed students who 
defaulted on their loans, found that these students were 
less knowledgeable about their loan options and reported 
that their loan counseling was unclear.32
“Financial literacy is important. You can never do enough,” 
says King at Wiley College. Educating students about 
finances starts when a student arrives on campus, 
he says. “We cascade information … just keep giving 
information and sitting down and talking to students.” 
But King also says that they often need to correct 
misinformation that students have received. For example, 
“students think Pell grants will cover tuition,” he says. High 
schools, he suggests, need to “create an awareness of 
loans and the reality of needing loans to finance college.” 
INSTITUTIONS MATTER
The experiences of the 12 HBCUs we studied and the 
success of the strategies they used to lower default rates 
offers powerful evidence that institutional practice can 
make a difference in determining a school’s default rate, 
even for schools that enroll high percentages of low-
income and first-generation students. And it disputes two 
arguments often used by colleges, particularly for-profit 
institutions, to lobby against the default rate measure: 
(1) the cohort default rate is primarily a reflection of the 
demographics of students enrolled and not institutional 
practice, and (2) the rate unfairly punishes schools that 
enroll high numbers of low-income students. 
For-profit higher education institutions, while different from 
HBCUs in mission and programs, have also struggled 
with high cohort default rates, and the Career College 
Association, which lobbies on behalf of for-profit colleges, 
is one of the most vocal opponents to sanctions based 
on default rates. In lobbying against the 2008 HEOA 
amendment, for example, CCA President Harris Miller stated, 
“We object to the singling out of schools that take on the risk 
and accept lower-income students, and saying the failure of 
those students to pay is an indicator of institutional quality.”33 
To bolster its argument, the CCA commissioned a review 
of existing research on causes of default rates, conducted 
by the Project on Academic Success at Indiana University. 
The report was critical of sanctions based on default 
rates and concluded the “default rate is not a good 
vehicle for assessing the quality of institutions.”34 But the 
research reviewed in the report suffers from two critical 
shortcomings that limit its ability to evaluate federal 
policy. First, the research considers whether or not a 
student graduates to be solely a “student” characteristic. 
Graduation is consistently one of the strongest predictors 
of whether a student defaults; therefore, it is not 
surprising that this same research concludes that student 
characteristics are far more powerful than institutional 
characteristics in predicting loan default. But research 
on graduation rates clearly illustrates that institutional 
practices and programs can moderate, and in some cases 
overpower, the role of income, race, or prior education 
in determining students’ outcomes.35 By categorizing 
graduation as only a student characteristic, the existing 
research overstates the influence of student background 
on a student’s likelihood to default.36
Second, along with categorizing graduation as solely a 
student characteristic, much of the existing research on 
causes of loan defaults uses data on the likelihood of 
an individual student to default in order to evaluate the 
appropriateness of federal policy.37 Using the research in 
this way assumes that federal policy sanctions institutions 
for each student who defaults. But that is not an accurate 
reflection of federal policy. The policy actually holds 
schools responsible for an entire cohort of students, and 
assumes that extremely high default rates—not each 
individual default—are a reflection of the institution’s 
quality: That a school where one in four students defaults 
almost immediately after leaving school over three 
consecutive years or where nearly half of students default 
in any one year is not providing an education worth the 
cost that students—and taxpayers—are paying. 
In contrast with the existing research that examines the 
likelihood of an individual student to default, we evaluated 
the actual cohort default rate (CDR) data that is used to 
determine sanctions under federal policy. We examined 
the 2007 CDR data for 1,778 four-year institutions and 
1,336 two-year institutions to determine how much 
of a school’s default rate could be explained by the 
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characteristics of the students it enrolls and how much 
could be attributed to institutional characteristics.38
Consistent with previous research, we found that student 
demographics are a significant predictor of cohort default 
rates. But we did not find that they are the sole predictor 
of an institution’s CDR or even the primary predictor. 
Instead, institutional characteristics, or in some cases 
unmeasured factors, are important to predicting whether 
an institution has a high or low default rate and potentially 
whether it runs afoul of federal sanctions. 
Among four-year institutions, the combination of student 
characteristics, institutional success in student retention 
and graduation, and other institutional characteristics did a 
good job of predicting which schools will have high or low 
cohort default rates. Overall, we were able to account for 
62 percent of the variation in institutions’ default rates. The 
story was different among two-year institutions, however. 
We were able to account for only 15 percent of the variation 
in default rates among public two-year institutions and 21 
percent among for-profit two-year institutions. This leaves 
the vast majority of variation in default rates among two-
year institutions unexplained. It also leaves a substantial 
portion, 38 percent, of the variation among four-year 
institutions unexplained. While student characteristics and 
institutional success matter, other unmeasured variables 
are clearly still important to consider. Some of these 
unmeasured variables may be student characteristics, such 
as first-generation status, or local economic conditions, 
but many are also likely to be institutional, especially given 
the paucity of good data available to measure institutional 
quality and practice. Many of the successful practices used 
by the Texas consortium, for example, are not measured in 
a federal data set, such as whether a school has a default 
prevention team or manager. 
Despite the role of these unmeasured variables, a few 
measurable student and institutional characteristics did 
emerge as significant in predicting default rates. Among 
student characteristics, a higher percentage of students 
receiving Pell grants, a measure of low-income student 
enrollment, significantly predicted higher cohort default 
rates among all types of institutions we analyzed: public 
four-year; private not-for-profit four-year; public two-year; 
and for-profit two-year.
Race was another significant student characteristic in 
predicting institutions’ cohort default rates, but it varied 
depending on the type of institution, an indication that 
race was merely a stand-in for other factors. Among 
four-year schools, the percentage of African-American 
students enrolled emerged as one of the strongest 
predictors of an institution’s default rate, with higher 
enrollment predicting a higher default rate. Among public 
two-year institutions, though, the percentage of African-
American students enrolled was not significant and 
instead the percentage of Hispanic students enrolled 
predicted a higher default rate. Once data from the 
Community College Survey of Student Engagement 
was included, however, no race variables emerged as 
significant. (See discussion of CCSSE data in “More 
Institutional Characteristics” sidebar.) And among for-
profit institutions, neither Hispanic nor African-American 
enrollment was significant. Instead, the percentage 
of white and Asian students enrolled predicted lower 
default rates. This variation in the influence of race 
across institutions indicates that race is likely a proxy 
for other student risk factors that influence institutions’ 
cohort default rates, which would be consistent with 
prior research.39 It is important, therefore, to interpret 
these results with caution. If the race of a student was 
what mattered, one would expect the same racial group 
or groups to consistently predict default rates across 
institution types, but this is not the case.
Even after controlling for these student characteristics, 
though, an institution’s ability to retain and eventually 
graduate its students emerged as an important factor 
in determining that institution’s cohort default rate, 
regardless of the types of students it enrolls. Both a higher 
retention rate and a higher graduation rate predicted 
lower default rates among four-year institutions, and 
higher retention rates predicted lower default rates 
among public two-year institutions. Surprisingly, though, 
neither retention rate nor graduation rate were significant 
predictors among for-profit colleges.40
While a higher retention rate was a significant predictor 
of lower default rates among public two-year institutions, 
an even stronger variable was the type of degrees 
students earned. To assess the effect of the types of 
degrees earned at two-year institutions, we divided the 
degrees awarded at each institution into four categories 
according to expected earnings after graduation, and 
included the percentage of students receiving degrees 
in the lowest earning category as a variable. 41 A higher 
percentage of students earning degrees in fields with the 
lowest salaries after graduation predicted higher cohort 
default rates.
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Other institutional characteristics also emerged as 
important variables in predicting cohort default rates. 
HBCU status, for example, predicted higher default rates 
among four-year institutions. This result may be because 
we were not able to control for the percentage of first-
generation students enrolled at institutions. Prior research 
has indicated that whether or not a student’s parents 
attended college is an important predictor of whether 
a student will default. 42 HBCUs enroll, as part of their 
mission, a high percentage of first-generation students, 
and this may be reflected in the results of this analysis.
Borrowing also mattered in predicting default rates, but 
not always as one might expect. For instance, higher 
average debt levels at four-year institutions actually 
predicted lower default rates. This indicates that higher 
debt may indicate some level of institutional quality—more 
prestigious institutions are often the most expensive, 
but this higher price seems to pay off in a student’s 
ability to repay his or her debt. Among for-profit two-
year institutions, a higher average amount of loan debt 
also predicted lower cohort default rates. This may be 
because some of the schools with the highest average 
debt levels include schools with a clear career-oriented 
focus and good job prospects for those students, such as 
culinary schools. The same is not true, however, for the 
percentage of students borrowing. A higher percentage of 
students taking out loans predicted higher cohort default 
rates among for-profit two-year institutions. (For more 
factors, see sidebar “More Institutional Characteristics—
Predicting Cohort Default Rates.”) 
No one expects institutions that serve a large number of 
low-income or first-generation students to have the same 
0.4 percent default rate as Harvard University, but our 
analysis suggests that it is appropriate to hold all schools 
accountable for consistently keeping loan default rates 
below 25 percent. The wide variation in results among 
institutions serving similar student populations is evidence 
of the influence institutions have over whether students 
stay in good standing on their loans. We ran an additional 
analysis comparing each institution’s actual default rate 
with a predicted default rate we calculated based on the 
institution’s student characteristics, HBCU status, and 
selectivity. Figure 2 presents the results for four-year 
institutions, with each institution’s actual and predicted 
default rate plotted. 
The diagonal line indicates the point at which an 
institution’s predicted and actual default rates match 
MORE INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS—PREDICTING 
COHORT DEFAULT RATES
• Selectivity was significant in predicting an institution’s 
default rate among four-year schools: Institutions that 
maintained the basic criteria of requiring students to submit 
a high school GPA for admission had lower default rates, 
and institutions admitting a higher percentage of applicants 
had higher default rates. 
• Among both not-for-profit four-year institutions and for-
profit two-year institutions, a higher student-faculty ratio 
predicted higher cohort default rates. This indicates that 
among these institutions, more opportunity for student 
and faculty interaction may contribute to lower default 
rates. 
• Higher per-student expenditures predicted lower default 
rates among public two-year institutions, but were 
not significant among four-year or for-profit two-year 
schools. 
• Among the public two-year institutions reporting 
results from the Community College Survey of Student 
Engagement (CCSSE), a higher score on the measure 
of academic challenge at an institution predicted lower 
cohort default rates, indicating that institutions at which 
students rated their school highly on measures of the 
quantity and rigor of the academic work had better 
outcomes in terms of loan repayment. In prior research 
on CCSSE results, the academic challenge measure has 
been most strongly related to academic outcomes rather 
than persistence or graduation, indicating that academics 
in school may affect students’ loan repayment behavior 
outside of school.*
• A higher score on the CCSSE measure of supportive 
learning, though, predicted higher default rates. This result 
runs counter to our research with HBCUs, which found 
that supporting students and establishing personal contact 
was an effective strategy in reducing loan default rates. But 
the CCSSE measure of supportive learning may confound 
institutional practice with student characteristics—those 
institutions that score highest on this measure may also 
have student populations with the highest needs, which 
could impact the outcomes of this analysis. 
• Among the public and private four-year institutions 
reporting results from the National Survey of Student 
Engagement (NSSE), another surprising outcome emerged. 
The only NSSE variable that was significant in predicting 
cohort default rates was the measure of student-faculty 
interaction among seniors, with higher scores predicting 
higher default rates. Much like the results for the supportive 
learning measure in CCSSE, this result runs counter to 
what we know about the positive impact of student-faculty 
interaction on graduation rates and student persistence. 
More research is clearly needed on how CCSSE and 
NSSE results predict student outcomes in terms of loan 
repayment.
*Kay McClenney, C. Nathan Marti, and Courtney Adkins, Student 
Engagement and Student Outcomes: Key Findings from CCSSE 
Validation Research, (Austin, TX: Community College Leadership 
Program, The University of Texas at Austin).
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ON THE HORIZON
Ten years after the “big panic,” schools are no longer in 
crisis mode. Thus, it is no surprise that the Texas consortium 
is less active and campus awareness of default prevention is 
less acute. Inactivity is, on one hand, a clear sign of success. 
Once the rates were brought down, attention and resources 
were allocated elsewhere. But without concentrated default 
prevention efforts, the rate has come back up at some 
schools. This is perhaps the most compelling evidence of 
the effectiveness of institutional measures to lower default 
rates—not that default rates declined so quickly at first, but 
that for colleges that diverted resources and attention away 
from default management, the rates began to climb back up. 
The new three-year calculation of cohort default rates will 
result in even higher increases in default rates across all 
institutions. Combined with the current economic climate 
perfectly. Institutions above the line have default rates 
that are better than expected, and institutions below the 
line have default rates that are worse than predicted. As 
the chart shows, no institution has a predicted default 
rate as high as 20 percent, much less the 25 percent 
federal threshold for sanctions, and institutions with 
similar predicted default rates can vary widely in their 
actual default rates. Institutions with a predicted default 
rate between 10 and 11 percent, for example, had actual 
default rates ranging from 3.3 percent to 13.2 percent.
While the HBCUs we studied faced unique challenges 10 
years ago, their lessons are clearly still applicable today 
and are relevant to a much wider group of institutions than 
just HBCUs. As Figure 2 shows, many institutions could do 
better in helping their students avoid default, a task that will 
become more urgent as an increasing number of schools 
face sanctions for high default rates in the next five years.
Figure 2. Predicted vs. Actual Cohort Default Rates Among Four-Year Institutions, 2007
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Source: Author analysis of 2007 cohort default rates, available from the U.S. Department of Education Office of Federal Student Aid, Default Prevention 
and Management at http://www.ed.gov/offices/OSFAP/defaultmanagement/cdr.html.
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and high unemployment rates, schools of all types may be 
facing the big panic once again. Institutions, however, will 
not be held accountable for the new three-year calculations 
until 2014, providing schools with valuable time to 
implement default prevention measures and reduce default 
rates before they face sanctions. The next few years 
represent a critical time for schools to understand why their 
default rates are high and how they can lower them.
Recognizing this, Texas Guaranteed held a special session 
during its 2009 conference focused on rising college costs 
and debt levels and the new three-year cohort default 
rate calculation. Texas Guaranteed staff informed schools 
of when the new calculation will go into effect and also 
provided examples from real schools on how this will have 
an impact on institutions. They also allowed schools to 
find out what their three-year default rates were before the 
Department of Education began releasing the numbers 
publicly. Jacob Fraire, assistant vice president of educational 
alliances at Texas Guaranteed, says that this communication 
is key. “Now that the law is passed, it is important to get the 
word out that there is time to make changes.”
The U.S. Department of Education is also working to get 
the word out to institutions and held multiple sessions 
at its December 2009 Federal Student Aid conference 
focused on the implications from the change to a three-
year calculation. The Department of Education’s Special 
Initiatives Branch in the Office of Federal Student Aid is 
developing a strategy to work closely with minority-serving 
institutions to help them avoid getting caught by the new 
three-year calculation. As part of this work, the Special 
Initiatives team is holding meetings at HBCUs around the 
country, bringing nearby institutions together for a day of 
intensive default prevention training. Reminiscent of the 
Texas consortium, the Special Initiatives team recently 
gathered many of the same institutions together at Jarvis 
Christian College to discuss strategies for reducing default 
rates once again. Walsh from the Special Initiatives team 
describes the meetings as a combination of presentations 
HOW THE FEDERAL AND STATE GOVERNMENTS CAN HELP
The lesson from the 12 HBCUs that successfully lowered 
their default rates a decade ago, along with the results from 
our analysis of cohort default rates, is that institutions can 
successfully lower default rates and avoid federal sanctions 
without changing the students they enroll. While student 
background characteristics do influence default risk, there are 
specific steps institutions can take to reduce that risk. Some 
of these steps are the same as those that increase graduation 
rates—improving student engagement and student support on 
campus can help students persist, be academically successful, 
and ultimately succeed after graduation. And some strategies 
are specific to reducing default rates, such as hiring a default 
prevention manager and improving students’ financial literacy 
skills and knowledge of student loans.
But to implement these steps effectively requires dedicated 
financial resources and dedicated attention from campus 
leadership, faculty, and staff—two things that are difficult 
to maintain long-term for institutions that operate on 
tight budgets, with small staffs, and experience frequent 
leadership and staff turnover. The attention from the 
Department of Education and large guarantors like Texas 
Guaranteed increased the awareness of the default rate 
problem among faculty and administrators and made 
lowering the default rate a priority among consortium 
schools. As importantly, financial resources from TG and 
others went a long way toward helping the schools hire 
additional staff, invest in new technology, and employ the 
expertise of third-party consultants.
Schools or students, however, are not the only ones who can 
help prevent loan defaults. There are steps that the federal 
government and state governments can take to reduce default 
rates:
• Focus on need-based aid for low-income students: The 
past 10 years have seen a growing reliance on debt and a 
shift away from need-based aid, particularly at the state level. 
By requiring low-income students to take out loans to attend 
public four-year, and in some cases two-year colleges, states 
and the federal government are putting these students at 
increased risk of defaulting on their loans. By reorienting 
grant aid to those students who most need it, and away from 
merit-based programs that reward middle- and upper-class 
students, institutions, states, and the federal government can 
reduce the amount of debt low-income students incur and 
help prevent students from defaulting on loans.*
• Require ‘default aversion’ to include working directly 
with colleges: Congress is currently debating the Student 
Aid and Fiscal Responsibility Act, or SAFRA, which allows 
part of the $3 billion in funds to be awarded to third-party 
agencies, most likely guarantee agencies, for default 
prevention work. The legislation also includes assessing 
the effectiveness of loan servicers’ default aversion work 
as part of the annual review of loan servicing contracts. As 
our research shows, default prevention is most effective 
when third-party agencies work closely with colleges to 
build capacity and expertise among the administration, staff, 
and financial aid office, and help institutions to develop 
institution-specific plans for reducing default rates. Default 
aversion activities should be clearly defined to include this 
type of collaborative work with institutions as an essential 
element of any successful default prevention initiative.
*See Kevin Carey, Colleges Giving More Financial Aid to Wealthy Students, (Washington, DC: Education Sector, January 2006), Erin Dillon and Kevin 
Carey, Drowning in Debt: The Emerging Student Loan Crisis, (Washington, DC: Education Sector, July 2009).
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on the three-year change and conversations with the 
schools about their challenges. According to Walsh, the 
meetings focus on “successful prevention strategies, 
which include identifying ‘at-risk’ borrowers and providing 
them with the support they need to be successful.” Special 
Initiatives asks the schools to bring their default prevention 
plans so that Walsh and other team members, along with 
fellow schools, can help create more effective plans.
But the Special Initiatives team is looking to push schools 
beyond just enhancing default prevention plans. Joel 
Harrell, the director of the Special Initiatives Branch, says 
the ultimate goal is to focus schools on improving student 
retention and student success. “When we say defaults, 
we want the thing that comes to mind to be student 
success—how do we get students to be academically 
successful? That’s where the action has to be.”
And it isn’t just HBCUs that need to focus on student 
success. Most institutions concerned with the new 
change will likely be those like the 12 HBCUs that faced 
sanctions after 1998—small, under-resourced and serving 
a primarily low-income and first-generation student 
population. But good default management practices and 
a commitment to preventing students from defaulting 
should not be limited to these institutions. Many colleges 
across the country, particularly large public universities, 
have “HBCUs” within them—groups of students who 
are at a higher risk of defaulting and who need the 
attention and resources that institutions like HBCUs 
dedicate to serving these students. Recent research 
has documented large racial gaps in student success 
at many institutions, and given the connection between 
graduation and defaults, it’s likely that those gaps persist 
in institutions’ default rates. Institutions can find out which 
of their students are at a higher risk of defaulting and 
have a moral obligation—even in the absence of federal 
pressure—to do all they can to help these students avoid 
the financially disastrous results of defaulting on student 
loans.
HOW THE FEDERAL AND STATE GOVERNMENTS CAN HELP (Continued)
• Investigate the potential of front-loading grant aid: 
Financial aid officers at the schools we spoke with mentioned 
the value of front-loading grants, meaning that students 
receive more grant aid in their first and second years. Front-
loading grants reduces the debt students take on early in 
their academic careers and allows financial aid officers to 
increase the ratio of loans to grants as students successfully 
progress through their education. This reduces the financial 
burden on students in their first years, and limits the amount 
of debt students have if they drop out early in their college 
career. The idea of front-loading Pell grants has gained 
attention in the past, although opponents object that it might 
appear to be a “bait and switch” for students who come to 
rely on the higher grant amounts, or that it could encourage 
students to leave mid-way through their education because 
of reduced grant aid in later years.** Unfortunately, there is 
inadequate research on the topic to inform policy decisions. 
Congress should consider funding a demonstration project to 
provide greater grant aid to students in their first two years of 
college, with lower amounts provided in students’ final years. 
The results from this project would help inform policymakers 
about the value of front-loading grant aid as a strategy for 
reducing debt loads and encouraging student retention. 
• Promote the New Income-Based Repayment (IBR) 
Program: Financial aid officers we spoke with expressed 
enthusiasm for the new IBR program and its potential to help 
students who are struggling with repayment because of low 
salaries and high debt levels. IBR allows students to limit loan 
payments to 10 percent of their income, thereby allowing 
borrowers to make payments within their means and also 
stay in good standing on their loans. But the implementation 
of the new program has been off to a rocky start, with 
a technical glitch that makes it difficult for borrowers to 
enroll.*** This glitch, along with different forms spread across 
multiple lenders, may have resulted in fewer students than 
expected enrolling in this program, thereby limiting its ability 
to help struggling borrowers. While financial aid officers 
are the front-line in providing students with the necessary 
information about IBR and the forms to enroll, the Department 
of Education can help by improving the ease with which 
students can enroll in the program and by communicating 
aggressively with schools and students about the availability 
of this new repayment option and who is eligible to take 
advantage of it.
• Help colleges and states develop early alert systems: 
Having an early alert system on campus was consistently 
identified by financial aid officers as an important strategy for 
keeping track of students and intervening before students 
drop out. But developing the data systems needed to 
monitor student progress effectively and training staff on 
using those systems requires expertise and resources, which 
are not equally available to all institutions. In addition, states 
could use these systems across institutions to track students 
who transfer between schools and from two-year to four-
year institutions. The federal government can encourage 
institutions to develop and implement early alert systems 
and can promote their use at the state level through targeted 
grants. The College Access and Completion Innovation Fund, 
a $600 million program in the proposed SAFRA legislation, is 
intended to support effective programs for student retention 
and should include developing early alert systems as an 
authorized use of both state and institutional grant funds.
**See, for instance, Restructuring Student Aid Could Reduce Low-Income Student Dropout Rate (Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, March 1995).
***Kelly Field, “Glitch May Block Student Borrowers from Enrolling in Income-Based Repayment,” The Chronicle of Higher Education, October 8, 2009.
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Methodology
We used a multivariate linear regression to isolate the impact 
of student and institutional characteristics on two-year cohort 
default rates. The dependent variable was the 2007 two-year 
cohort default rate, which measures the percentage of students 
who entered repayment on their loans in fiscal year 2007 and 
subsequently defaulted by the end of the following fiscal year. To 
keep the data consistent with the 2007 cohort of students, we 
used 2007 data on student and institutional characteristics from 
IPEDS, the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System 
compiled by the federal government.i For institutions with fewer 
than 30 borrowers, we used a weighted average of the past 
three years of cohort default rates as the dependent variable. 
This is consistent with the calculation the U.S. Department of 
Education uses to determine whether a school faces sanctions 
for high default rates in a particular year. We excluded from 
analysis all schools with fewer than 30 borrowers total over the 
past three years. This eliminates schools that are likely to see 
wide fluctuations in default rates from year to year and is also 
consistent with U.S. Department of Education regulations. 
We included only institutions that grant an associates or 
bachelor’s degree in the 50 states and the District of Columbia. 
Nearly 600 institutions in the cohort default rate database 
were excluded because they report one default rate for several 
campuses. For example, Pennsylvania State University reports the 
same default rate for its more competitive University Park campus 
as it does for its 19 regional campuses. Rather than aggregate 
the data on student and institutional characteristics for these 
campuses, which vary widely on these variables, we excluded all 
campuses that did not have a unique cohort default rate. 
Because of their different missions and educational programs, 
we analyzed four-year institutions separately from two-year 
institutions. We analyzed public and private not-for-profit four-
year institutions, and public and for-profit two-year institutions. 
The sample sizes for four-year for-profit institutions and non-
profit two-year institutions were too small to yield reliable results.
Independent Variables
Among four-year institutions, we first needed to control for 
graduate student enrollment. Cohort default rates include both 
undergraduate and graduate students who default on their 
loans. Research has shown that graduate-level students are less 
likely to default; therefore, an institution with a large graduate 
program, such as a law school or medical school, might have 
lower default rates simply because of the types of programs 
it operates. To control for this, we included the percentage of 
students receiving graduate-level degrees first in the analysis of 
four-year institutions.
To determine the impact of student characteristics, we included 
data on the racial distribution of students enrolled at each school 
(percentage of white, African-American, Hispanic, and Asian 
students), the percentage of Pell grant recipients (as a measure 
of income), the percentage of female students enrolled and the 
percentage of adult students enrolled. We also did a separate 
analysis of the 1,186 four-year institutions that reported SAT 
score data to determine the impact of students’ academic 
preparation on default rates.
While IPEDS collects a large amount of institutional data, very 
few variables can be directly attributed to institutional quality 
or student outcomes. Based on prior research showing the 
importance of student academic success on default risk, 
we included institutional retention rates (the percentage of 
students who remain after their first year) and graduation rates 
as measures of how well institutions are doing in promoting 
student success. By first controlling for student characteristics, 
we were able to measure the independent effect of retention and 
graduation rates on default rates.
We also included information on the percentage of students 
taking out loans and the average loan amount to determine 
if borrowing patterns influenced cohort default rates. Other 
institutional variables included in the analysis were: total 
enrollment, student-to-faculty ratio, expenditures per student, 
institutional control (e.g., public private not-for-profit, and private 
for-profit), and among four-year schools, whether the institution 
is a historically black college or university. We also included two 
variables when analyzing four-year institutions related to the 
selectivity of the institution: the percentage of students admitted 
and whether the institution requires students to submit a high 
school GPA for admission.
To assess the impact of the types of degrees students earned 
at two-year institutions, we divided the degree types into four 
categories according to expected earnings after graduation.ii 
We included the percentage of students receiving degrees in the 
lowest earning category as a variable. Similarly, to determine if 
degree type influenced default rates at four-year institutions, we 
included the percentage of students receiving degrees in liberal 
arts majors as a variable.
Because IPEDS data includes little information on what is 
happening at institutions in terms of institutional practice, we 
included data from the National Survey of Student Engagement 
and the Community College Survey of Student Engagement. 
We analyzed these data separately because they were provided 
for a smaller subset of institutions—367 four-year institutions 
reported NSSE data and 486 community colleges reported 
CCSSE results.
See Tables A1 and A2 for a listing of all the variables included in 
the analysis for four-year and two-year institutions.
Results
Four-Year Institutions
We first analyzed four-year public and private not-for-profit 
institutions together. The model explained 62 percent of the 
APPENDIX: Methodology and Results of Our Analysis of Cohort Default Rates
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variance in default rates. The percentage of graduate students 
earning degrees explained 5 percent of the variance in cohort 
default rates, with, as expected, a higher percentage of graduate 
degrees predicting a lower cohort default rate. Each of the 
student characteristics was then entered into the regression 
equation using a stepwise analysis to see which characteristics 
accounted for a significant proportion of the variance in cohort 
default rates.
The percentage of Pell grant recipients and the percentage of 
African-American students enrolled were the two strongest 
predictors of cohort default rates of the student characteristics, 
with higher enrollments of both types of students predicting a 
higher CDR. The percentage of women enrolled predicted lower 
default rates. Adult enrollment and the percentage of Asian 
students enrolled were both included in the final model, although 
neither variable was significant.
After all student characteristics were entered, institutional 
characteristics explained an additional 8.7 percent of the 
variance in cohort default rates. One of the strongest predictors 
was whether or not an institution was an HBCU, with HBCU 
status predicting higher default rates. Higher retention rates and 
graduation rates both were strong and significant predictors of 
lower cohort default rates.
Institutions that maintained the basic admissions criteria of 
requiring students to submit a high school GPA for admission 
also had lower default rates, indicating that minimal selectivity 
does impact an institution’s CDR. The percentage of students 
admitted—another more nuanced measure of selectivity—
also significantly predicted cohort default rates, with a higher 
percentage of students admitted predicting higher default 
rates. 
Two additional institutional characteristics were also significant: 
A higher student-faculty ratio predicted higher default rates, and 
a higher average amount of annual loan debt predicted lower 
default rates (see Table A3).
When SAT scores were added to the model, they explained an 
additional 1 percent of the variance in cohort default rates for 
the 1,186 schools that reported SAT data. Higher SAT scores 
predicted lower cohort default rates. Once SAT scores were 
added, student-faculty ratio and average loan amount were 
Table A1. Four-Year Institutions
Control Percentage of degrees awarded to 
graduate-level students
Student 
Characteristics
Percentage of students receiving Pell 
grants
Percentage white enrollment
Percentage African-American enrollment
Percentage Hispanic enrollment
Percentage Asian enrollment
Percentage female enrollment
Percentage adult undergraduate 
enrollment
Student Success Retention rate (full-time, first-time 
students)
Six-year graduation rate (full-time, first-
time students)
Institutional 
Characteristics
Percentage of students receiving loans
Average loan amount
Student/Faculty ratio
High School GPA required for admission
Percentage of students admitted
Expenditures per student
Percentage of students receiving liberal 
arts degrees
HBCU status
Non-profit status
Additional Analysis: 
Average SAT Score
Average SAT score
Additional 
Analysis: National 
Survey of Student 
Engagement
Academic challenge - 1st year students
Academic challenge - Seniors
Active & Collaborative Learning - 1st year
Active & Collaborative Learning - Seniors
Student-Faculty Interaction - 1st year
Student-Faculty Interaction - Seniors
Enriching Education - 1st year
Enriching Education - Seniors
Supportive Campus - 1st year
Supportive Campus - Seniors
Table A2. Two-Year Institutions
Student 
Characteristics
Percentage of students receiving Pell 
grants
Percentage white enrollment
Percentage African-American enrollment
Percentage Hispanic enrollment
Percentage Asian enrollment
Percentage female enrollment
Percentage adult undergraduate 
enrollment
Student Success Retention rate (first-time, full-time 
students)
Three-year graduation rate (first-time, 
full-time students)
Institutional 
Characteristics
Percentage of students receiving loans
Average loan amount
Student/Faculty ratio
Expenditures per student
Percentage of students earning degrees 
in the lowest earning category (public 
institutions only)
Additional 
Analysis: 
Community 
College Survey 
of Student 
Engagement
Active & Collaborative Learning
Student Effort
Academic Challenge
Student-Faculty Interaction
Supportive Learning
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no longer significant. Instead, non-profit status emerged as a 
significant predictor of lower default rates (see Table A4).
We also did a separate analysis with the 367 institutions 
that publicly report data from the National Survey of Student 
Engagement. Only one NSSE variable was significant in the 
final model: Higher scores on the measure of student-faculty 
interaction in a student’s senior year were related to higher 
cohort default rates. This result is surprising in light of our 
research showing that student-faculty interaction can be helpful 
in communication with students about their loan responsibilities. 
More research is needed on the relationship between NSSE 
scores and student loan default rates to understand why 
student-faculty interaction predicts higher default rates (see 
Table A5).
Four-Year Institutions by Institution Type
While institutional control was not a significant variable in the 
overall model, we analyzed public and private not-for-profit 
institutions separately to determine if there were important 
differences between institution types in which variables 
predicted default rates. 
The model predicted a larger amount of the variance in default 
rates, 64 percent, among private not-for-profit institutions, 
Table A3. Final Model: Four-Year Not-for-Profit and Public Institutions
Variables B SE B Beta Sig. R2
Change 
R2
Sig. 
Change
Percentage of degrees awarded to graduate-
level students
- 2.059 0.377 - 0.096 < .01 0.052 0.053 < .01
Percentage of students receiving Pell grants 0.039 0.006 0.177 < .01 0.456 0.404 < .01
Percentage African-American enrollment 0.04 0.007 0.229 < .01 0.524 0.068 < .01
Percentage adult undergraduate enrollment - 0.008 0.005 - 0.038 ns 0.529 0.005 < .01
Percentage female enrollment - 0.017 0.005 - 0.056 < .01 0.536 0.007 < .01
Percentage Asian enrollment 0.001 0.011 0.002 ns 0.538 0.003 < .01
Retention Rate - 0.063 0.008 - 0.215 < .01 0.59 0.051 < .01
Graduation Rate - 0.032 0.006 - 0.163 < .01 0.603 0.014 < .01
HBCU status 2.803 0.561 0.179 < .01 0.611 0.008 < .01
High School GPA required for admission - 0.649 0.148 - 0.076 < .01 0.618 0.007 < .01
Student/Faculty ratio 0.031 0.011 0.048 < .01 0.62 0.003 < .01
Average loan amount - 9.08E - 05 0 - 0.045 < .01 0.621 0.002 < .05
Percentage of students admitted 0.009 0.004 0.049 < .05 0.623 0.002 < .05
R2 = .623, n = 1,386 schools   ns = not significant
Table A4. Final Model: Four-Year Not-for-Profit and Public Institutions With SAT Score Analysis
Variables B SE B Beta Sig. R2
Change 
R2
Sig. 
Change
Percentage of degrees awarded to graduate-level students - 1.405 0.331 - 0.077 < .01 0.028 0.029 < .01
Percentage of students receiving Pell grants 0.032 0.006 0.156 < .01 0.458 0.43 < .01
Percentage African-American enrollment 0.037 0.007 0.228 < .01 0.529 0.071 < .01
Average SAT score - 0.003 0.001 - 0.11 < .01 0.582 0.054 < .01
Percentage female enrollment - 0.016 0.005 - 0.065 < .01 0.59 0.008 < .01
Retention Rate - 0.063 0.01 - 0.228 < .01 0.617 0.027 < .01
Graduation Rate - 0.025 0.007 - 0.142 < .01 0.623 0.007 < .01
HBCU status 2.136 0.551 0.151 < .01 0.628 0.005 < .01
Non-profit status - 0.387 0.127 - 0.062 < .01 0.63 0.003 < .01
Percentage of students admitted - 0.008 0.003 - 0.047 < .05 0.632 0.002 < .05
High School GPA required for admission - 0.316 0.149 - 0.038 < .05 0.633 0.001 < .05
R2 = .633, n = 1,186   ns = not significant
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compared with 59 percent among public institutions. For both 
types of institutions, the percentage of Pell recipients and African-
American enrollment were significant and strong predictors of 
default rates. Among private not-for-profit institutions, Hispanic 
student enrollment also predicted higher default rates, while 
female enrollment predicted lower default rates.
Retention rates predicted lower default rates across both types 
of institutions, but graduation rates emerged as significant only 
among public four-year institutions. Both HBCU status and 
whether an institution required students to submit a high school 
GPA for admission remained significant predictors for both types 
of institutions, with HBCU status predicting higher default rates 
and requiring a GPA predicting lower default rates. 
Among private not-for-profit institutions, a higher student-faculty 
ratio remained significant as a predictor of higher default rates and 
a higher average loan amount was significant in predicting lower 
default rates. Admission rates were also significant, with a higher 
percentage of students admitted predicting higher default rates.
Among public institutions, a higher graduation rate and a higher 
percentage of students earning liberal arts degrees predicted 
lower default rates (see Tables A6 and A7).
Two-Year Institutions
Our regression model explains just 15 percent of the variance in 
cohort default rates among two-year institutions, and many of 
the significant variables were different when compared with four-
year institutions.
Consistent with our analysis of four-year institutions, Pell 
enrollment significantly predicted higher default rates. Race still 
mattered among two-year institutions, but white enrollment and 
Asian enrollment emerged as significant, with higher enrollments 
Table A5. Final Model: Four-Year Not-for-Profit and Public Institutions With NSSE Results Analysis
Variables B SE B Beta Sig. R2
Change 
R2
Sig. 
Change
Percentage of degrees awarded to graduate-level 
students - 0.341 0.514 - 0.025 ns 0.002 0.005 ns
Percentage of students receiving Pell grants 0.047 0.01 0.248 < .01 0.396 0.395 < .01
Percentage African-American enrollment 0.059 0.008 0.289 < .01 0.463 0.068 < .01
Average SAT score 1.00E-03 0.002 0.045 ns 0.487 0.025 < .01
Percentage female enrollment - 0.016 0.007 - 0.088 < .05 0.499 0.013 < .01
Graduation Rate - 0.034 0.012 - 0.211 < .01 0.552 0.053 < .01
Retention Rate - 0.062 0.019 - 0.235 < .01 0.562 0.011 < .01
Non-profit status - 0.872 0.22 - 0.168 < .01 0.569 0.008 < .01
Faculty-Student Interaction, Seniors 0.073 0.019 0.166 < .01 0.585 0.017 < .01
R2 = .585 , n = 367   ns = not significant
HBCU status was excluded because there were only 7 HBCUs included in the sample.
Table A6. Final Model: Not-for-Profit Four-Year Institutions
Variables B SE B Beta Sig. R2
Change 
R2
Sig. 
Change
Percentage of degrees awarded to graduate-level students - 1.561 0.398 - 0.083 < .01 0.054 0.055 < .01
Percentage of students receiving Pell grants 0.042 0.007 0.203 < .01 0.497 0.443 < .01
Percentage African-American enrollment 0.047 0.009 0.262 < .01 0.575 0.079 < .01
Percentage female enrollment - 0.024 0.006 - 0.091 < .01 0.582 0.007 < .01
Percentage Hispanic enrollment 0.036 0.011 0.073 < .01 0.584 0.003 < .01
Percentage Asian enrollment - 0.004 0.019 - 0.005 ns 0.589 0.005 < .01
Retention Rate - 0.075 0.008 - 0.273 < .01 0.626 0.038 < .01
HBCU status 3.326 0.747 0.193 < .01 0.633 0.007 < .01
Percentage of students admitted 0.012 0.004 0.067 < .01 0.636 0.004 < .01
Average loan amount - 8.56E - 05 0 - 0.047 < .05 0.638 0.002 < .05
Student/Faculty ratio 0.031 0.013 0.052 < .05 0.640 0.002 < .05
High School GPA required for admission - 0.386 0.185 - 0.044 < .05 0.642 0.002 < .05
R2 = .642, n = 879   ns = not significant
22 EDUCATION SECTOR REPORTS: Lowering Student Loan Default Rates www.educationsector.org
Table A7. Final Model: Public Four-Year Institutions
Variables B SE B Beta Sig. R2
Change 
R2
Sig. 
Change
Percentage of degrees awarded to graduate-level students - 2.79 0.953 - 0.093 < .01 0.05 0.052 < .01
Percentage of students receiving Pell grants 0.034 0.011 0.148 < .01 0.39 0.341 < .01
Percentage African-American enrollment 0.029 0.011 0.182 < .01 0.461 0.071 < .01
Retention Rate - 0.042 0.016 - 0.132 < .05 0.486 0.026 < .01
HBCU status 3.375 0.789 0.255 < .01 0.5 0.015 < .01
High School GPA required for admission - 0.497 0.245 - 0.063 < .05 0.557 0.058 < .01
Percentage adult enrollment - 0.014 0.012 - 0.05 ns 0.567 0.01 < .01
Percentage white enrollment 0.012 0.007 0.081 ns 0.582 0.016 < .01
Graduation Rate - 0.069 0.012 - 0.311 < .01 0.589 0.008 < .01
Percentage of students receiving liberal arts degrees - 0.017 0.006 - 0.085 < .01 0.592 0.003 < .05
R2 = .592, n = 507   ns = not significant
of both predicting lower default rates. Higher adult enrollment 
predicted higher default rates. 
Surprisingly, neither retention rate nor graduation rate were 
significant predictors of default rates in the final model. A higher 
student-faculty ratio, however, predicted higher default rates, 
while a higher average loan amount predicted lower default 
rates. Contrary to many news reports of the large difference in 
default rates among for-profit and public two-year institutions, 
when other student and institutional characteristics were 
controlled, for-profit status was not significant in predicting an 
institution’s default rate (see Table A8).
Two-Year Institutions by Institution Type
We analyzed public institutions and for-profit institutions 
separately to determine if there were differences in which 
variables were significant and how much variance the model 
explained. We also included the percentage of students receiving 
low-earning degrees in the analysis of public institutions. There 
was not enough variance in this measure to include it in the 
analysis of for-profit institutions (see Table A9).
As with four-year institutions, the percentage of Pell grant 
recipients was one of the strongest predictors of default rates 
among public two-year institutions. The percentage of Hispanic 
students enrolled also predicted a higher CDR.
Among public institutions, a higher percentage of students 
earning degrees in the lowest earning subjects significantly 
predicted higher cohort default rates. Retention rate was also a 
significant predictor of lower default rates, although graduation 
rate was not. Finally, higher expenditures per student predicted 
lower cohort default rates.
Community College Survey of Student Engagement results 
were analyzed for 486 public community colleges. With CCSSE 
variables included, the model explained 19 percent of the 
variance in default rates. Retention rates were no longer a 
significant predictor of default rates in the analysis with CCSSE 
results. Instead, graduation rates significantly predicted lower 
default rates. Among CCSSE variables, two were significant. 
A higher score on the measure of academic challenge at an 
institution predicted lower cohort default rates, while a higher 
score on the measure of supportive learning predicted higher 
default rates (Table A10).
The model varied substantially for for-profit two-year institutions, 
although it still only explained a small amount—21 percent—
Table A8. Final Model: Public Two-Year and For-Profit Two-Year Institutions
Variables B SE B Beta Sig. R2
Change 
R2
Sig. 
Change
Percentage of students receiving Pell grants 0.068 0.008 0.278 < .01 0.106 0.107 < .01
Percentage white enrollment - 0.028 0.007 - 0.141 < .01 0.121 0.015 < .01
Percentage Asian enrollment - 0.057 0.02 - 0.098 < .01 0.127 0.007 < .01
Percentage adult enrollment 0.028 0.012 0.075 < .05 0.129 0.004 < .05
Retention Rate - 0.021 0.012 - 0.057 ns 0.135 0.007 < .01
Student-Faculty ratio 0.089 0.02 0.136 < .01 0.15 0.016 < .01
Average loan amount - 1.75E - 4 7.80E - 5 - 0.073 < .05 0.154 0.004 < .05
R2 = .154, n = 965   ns = not significant
23EDUCATION SECTOR REPORTS: Lowering Student Loan Default Rateswww.educationsector.org
Table A9. Final Model: Public Two-Year Institutions
Variables B SE B Beta Sig. R2
Change 
R2
Sig. 
Change
Percentage of students receiving Pell grants 0.07 0.01 0.253 < .01 0.055 0.056 < .01
Percentage Hispanic enrollment 0.033 0.01 0.114 < .01 0.076 0.023 < .01
Retention Rate - 0.063 0.016 - 0.145 < .01 0.095 0.02 < .01
Percentage students receiving low-earning degrees 3.904 0.649 0.218 < .01 0.143 0.049 < .01
Expenditures per student - 3.81E - 4 1.42E - 4 - 0.108 < .01 0.153 0.011 < .01
R2 = .153, n = 731   ns = not significant
of the variation in default rates. The percentage of Pell grant 
recipients remained a powerful predictor of default rates. The 
percentage of African-American or Hispanic enrollment was not 
significant; however, higher enrollment among white or Asian 
students predicted lower default rates. The percentage of adult 
students enrolled predicted higher cohort default rates.
Borrowing patterns were also significant in predicting default 
rates. A higher average amount of loan debt at for-profit 
institutions predicted lower cohort default rates. The same is 
not true, however, for the percentage of students borrowing—a 
higher percentage of students taking out loans predicted higher 
cohort default rates among for-profit two-year institutions. A 
higher student-faculty ratio also predicted higher cohort default 
rates. Neither retention rate nor graduation rate were significant 
in predicting default rates (see Table A11).
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